Assess the view that the process of globalisation has led to changes in both the amount of crime and the types of crime committed

Globalisation refers to the increasing interconnectedness of societies, so that what happens in one locality is shaped by distant events and vice versa. Globalisation has many causes including spread if information communication technology, the global mass media, cheap flights, deregulation of markets and easy movements of businesses.

Held et al argues there’s been globalisation of crime; an increasing interconnectedness of crime across national borders. The same process that brought globalisation of legitimate activities has also brought the spread of transnational organised crime. Globalisation creates new opportunities for crime and new means of committing crime, for example cyber crime. Manuel Castells (1998) argues because of globalisation there is a globalised criminal economy worth £1 trillion. This takes a number of forms such as arms dealing, human trafficking, green crime and many others. The global criminal economy has both a demand and supply side. A reason for scale of transnational organised crime is demand from the rich west. However the global criminal economy couldn’t survive without a supply side that provides the source for demands of the west, such as drugs and prostitutes. This supply is linked to the globalisation process. For example third world drug producing countries such as Columbia have large populations of impoverished peasants. For them drug investment is attractive; it’s simple to produce and commands high prices. In Columbia, 20% of peasants rely on cocaine production for their livelihood; cocaine out sells all other exports. Thus to understand drug crime we cannot focus only on countries where drugs are consumed.

Globalisation creates new insecurities and produces a new mentality of risk consciousness where risk is global rather than isolated. For example rise in economic migrants has led to concerns of risk of disorder and increasing need to protect borders. Much knowledge of risks comes from the media which often exaggerates dangers we face. For example with immigration the media create moral panics of supposed threats, often fuelled by politicians. Negative coverage of immigrants has led to hate crimes against minorities in European countries. One result is the intensification of social control at the national level. The UK has toughened borders; there is now no limit as to how long a person may be held in immigration detention. Other European states with land borders have introduced fences to prevent illegal crossings. Another result of globalised risk is increased international cooperation in various wars on drugs, terrorism ect, particularly since terrorist attacks off September 11th, 2001.

Socialist Ian Taylor (1997) argues globalisation has led to changes in the pattern and extent of crime. By giving free rein to market forces globalisation has created greater inequality and rising crime. Globalisation has created crime at both ends of the social spectrum. It has allowed transnational corporations to switch manufacturing to low wage countries, producing job insecurity, unemployment and poverty. Deregulation means government has little control over their own economies, for example to create jobs or raise taxes while state spending on welfare has declined. Marketisation encourages people to see themselves as individual consumers and undermining social cohesion. Left realists argue increasingly materialistic culture promoted by the global media portrays success in terms of lifestyle of consumption. All these factors create insecurity and widening inequality that encourage people, especially the poor to commit crime. The lack of legitimate opportunity destroys self respect and drives the unemployed to look for illegitimate ones such as the drugs trade. At the same time globalisation creates criminal opportunities for elite groups on a grand scale. For example deregulation of financial markets creates opportunity for movement of funds across the globe to avoid taxation. Similarly the creation of transnational bodies such as the European Union offers opportunities for fraudulent claims for subsidies; estimated to be $7 billion per annum. Globalisation has led to new patterns in employment which create new opportunities for crime. It has led to increased use of subcontracting to recruit flexible workers, often working illegally for less than minimum wage. Taylor’s theory is useful in linking global trends in the capitalist economy to changes in the patterns of crime. However it does not adequately explain the changes make people behave in criminal ways. For example not all the poor turn to crime.

Hobbs and Dunningham found that the way crime is organised is linked to economic changes brought by globalisation. It increasingly involves individuals with contracts acting as a hub around which a loose knit network forms, composed of other individuals seeking opportunities and linking legitimate and illegitimate activities. Hobbs and Dunningham argues this contrasts with large scale, hierarchical mafia style criminal organisation of the past, such as the Kray brothers of east London.

These new forms of organisation sometimes have international links, especially with the drugs trade, but crime is still rooted in its local context. For example individuals still need local contacts and networks to find opportunities and to sell their drugs. Hobbs and Dunningham thus conclude crime works as a “glocal” system; it’s locally based but with global connections. This means the form it takes varies from place to place, according to local conditions, even if influenced by global factors such as availability of drugs from abroad. Hobbs and Dunningham argue that changes associated with globalisation have led to changes in patterns of crime, for example the shift from a hierarchical gang structure to loose flexible networks. However it’s not clear that such patterns are new, nor that have the older structures disappeared. It may be the two have always coexisted. Conclusions may not be generalisable to other criminal activities elsewhere.

Misha Glenny (2008) looks at the relationship between globalisation and criminal organisation in “McMafia”; the organisations emerging from Russia and Eastern Europe following the fall of communism. Glenny traces origins of transnational organised crime to the breakup of the Soviet Union after 1989 which coincided with deregulation of global markets. Under communism the soviet state regulated prices of everything. However following the fall of communism, the Russian government deregulated most sectors of the economy except for national resources such as oil. These commodities remained at their old soviet price, often a fraction of the world market price. Thus anyone with access to funds, such as former KGB men, could buy up resources like oil cheaply. By selling them abroad for huge profits they became Russia’s new capitalist class, known as the oligarchs. Meanwhile the collapse of communist states heralded a period of increasing disorder. To protect wealth capitalists turned to mafias that began to spring up. These were often alliances between ex KGB and convicts. Among the most ruthless were the Chechen mafia. However these mafias were unlike the old Italian mafias which were based on family ties with a clear hierarchy. The new Russian organisations were purely economic organisations formed to pursue self interest. For example the Chechen mafia, originated in Chechnya franchised operations to non Chechen groups. Chechen mafia became a brand sold to other protection rackets so long as they carried their word, otherwise the brand would be damaged. With the assistance of violent organisations the billionaires protected their wealth and found a means to move it out of the country. Criminal organisations were vital to the entry of the new Russian capitalist class in the world economy. At the same time the Russian mafias were able to build links with criminal organisations with other parts in the world.

Green or environmental crime can be defined as crime against the environment. Much green crime is linked by globalisation and increasing interconnectedness of societies. Regardless of the division of the world into separate nation states, the planet is a single eco system and threats to the eco system are increasingly global rather than local. For example atmospheric pollution from industry in one country can turn to acid rain that falls in another country, poisoning rivers. Similarly accidents in nuclear industry, such as in Chernobyl in Ukraine in 1986 can spread radioactive material over thousands of miles, showing how a problem in one locality can have worldwide effects.

Most threats to human well being and the eco system are now human made rather than natural. Unlike past natural dangers such as famine the risks we face today are our own making. Ulrich Beck (1992) argues in today’s late modern society we can provide adequate resources for all. However an increase in productivity and technology that sustains it creates new manufactured risks; dangers we have never faced before. Many of these risks involve harm to environment and its consequences for humanity such as global warming caused by greenhouse gas emissions from industry. Like climate change many of these risks are global rather than local in nature, leading Beck to describe late modern society as global risk society.

There’s the question of legality in green criminology. Traditional criminology has not been concerned with such behaviour, since its subject matter is defined by the criminal law, and no law has been broken. The starting point for this approach is the national and international laws and regulators concerning the environment. For example Situ and Emmons (2000) define environmental crime as an unauthorized act that violates the law. Like other traditional approaches in criminology it investigates patterns and causes of law breaking. The advantage of this approach is it clearly defines subject matter. However it is criticised for accepting official definitions of environmental problems and crimes which are often shaped by powerful groups such as big business to serve their own interests. Green criminology takes a more radical approach. It starts from the notion of harm rather than criminal law. For example Rob White (2008) argues the proper subject of criminology is any action that harms the physical environment or human and non human animals within it, even if no law has been broken. In fact many environmental crimes are not illegal thus the subject matter of green criminology is wider than that of traditional criminology. Thus green criminology is a transgressive criminology; overstepping bounds of traditional criminology to include new issues. Furthermore different countries have different laws, thus harmful action in one country may not be a crime in the other. Thus legal definitions cannot provide a consistent standard of harm since they’re the product of individual nation states and their political processes. Thus by moving away from the legal definition green criminology can develop a global perspective on environmental harm. This approach is like the Marxist view of crimes of the powerful. Marxists argue the capitalist class are able to shape the law and define crime so that their own exploitative activities are not criminalised, or where they are to ensure enforcement is weak. Similarly green criminologists argue powerful interests; especially nation states and transnational corporations are able to define in their own interests what counts as unacceptable environmental harm.

In general nation states and transnational corporations adopt what White (2008) calls an anthropocentric or human centred view of environmental harm. This view assumes humans have a right to dominate nature for their own ends and puts economic growth before the environment. White contrasts this with an ecocentric view that sees humans and their environment as interdependent, so that environmental harm hurts humans also. This view sees both humans and environment as liable to exploitation, particularly by global capitalism. In general green criminology adopts the ecocentric view as the basis for judging environmental harm.

Green criminologist Nigel South (2008) classifies green crime into primary and secondary types. Primary green crimes are crimes that result directly from the destruction and degradation of the earth’s resources. South identifies four main types of primary deviance. Crimes of air pollution; burning fossil fuels from industry and transport contributes to global warming. The potential criminals are governments, business and consumers. Crimes of deforestation; for example crops destroyed by pesticide and illegal logging. Criminals include the state and big business. Crimes of species and animal rights; many species are under threat and there is trafficking in animals and animal parts. Meanwhile old crimes such as dog fights are on the increase. Crimes of water pollution; unclean drinking water and marine pollution threaten humans and biodiversity. Criminals are business who dump toxic waste and governments who discharge untreated sewage.

Secondary green crime is crime that grows out of the flouting of rules aimed at preventing or regulating environmental disasters. For example governments often break their own regulations and cause environmental harms. An example is state violence against opposition groups. States condemn terrorism but then resort to the same methods themselves, for example in 1985 the French secret service blew up a green peace ship that protested against nuclear weapons testing in the pacific. Day (1991) argues any oppositional group to nuclear power are treated as enemies of the state. Another example is hazardous waste and organised crime. Disposal of toxic waste from the chemical and nuclear industries is highly profitable. Because of the high cost of legal disposal businesses seek to dispose of waste illegally. For example in Italy eco mafias benefit from dumping waste; much dumped at sea. Reece Walters (2007) argues the ocean floor has been a radioactive waste dump for decades. Illegal waste dumping often has a globalised character. For example Fred Bridgland (2006) describes how after the 2004 tsunami barrels of radioactive waste dumped by European countries washed up on beaches of Somalia. Elsewhere big business ships waste to the third world where costs are lower to dispose waste. Similarly transnational corporations may offload pharmaceuticals that have been banned in the west on grounds of safety onto the third world. Illegal waste disposal illustrates the problem of law enforcement in a globalised world. The very existence of laws to regulate waste disposal in developed countries pushes up costs to business and creates incentive to dump illegally in the third world. In some cases it’s not even illegal since less developed countries may lack necessary legislation to outlaw it.

Both strengths and weaknesses of green criminology arise from its focus on global environmental concerns. It recognises the importance of environmental issues and the need to address the harms and risks of environmental damage both to humans and animals. However by focusing on the broader concept of harms rather than legally defined crimes it’s hard to define boundaries of its field of study clearly. Defining these boundaries involves making moral or political statements about which actions ought to be regarded as wrong. Critics argue this is a matter of values and cannot be established objectively.

Marxist William Chambliss (1989) argues sociologists should investigate state organised crimes as well as crimes of capitalism. Penny Green and Tony Ward (2005) define state crime as illegal or deviant activities perpetrated by state agencies. It includes all forms of crime committed by or on behalf of states and governments in order to further policies. State crimes include genocide, wars, assassination ect. State crimes do not include acts that benefit individuals, for example accepting bribes. Eugene McLaughlin (2001) identifies four categories of state crime; Political crimes such as corruption or censorship, crimes by police such as torture, economic crimes such as violations of health and safety laws and social and cultural crimes such as institutional racism.

State crime is one of the most serious forms of crime. The power of the state enables it to commit large scale crimes with widespread victimisation. For example in 1975 its believed Pol pot’s government killed two million people. Michalowski and Kramer (2006) argue great power and great crimes are inseparable. The states monopoly of violence gives it the potential to inflict massive harm, while its power means it’s well placed to conceal its crimes or evade punishment for them. Although media attention is often on state crimes in the third world, democratic states such as Britain are guilty of military use of torture in Iraq. However the principle of national sovereignty, that states are the supreme authority within their own borders, makes it difficult for external authorities such as the United Nations to intervene. This is despite the existence of international conventions and laws against acts such as genocide, war crimes and racial discrimination. It is also the state’s role to define what is criminal and to manage the criminal justice system and prosecute offenders. State crimes undermine the system of justice. Its power to make the law also means it can avoid defining its own actions as harmful or criminal. For example in Nazi Germany the state created laws to sterilise the disabled. State control of the criminal justice system also means it can persecute its enemies.

One approach to the study of state crime is through the notion of human rights. There is no single list of what constitutes as human rights. However most definitions include the following; Natural rights that people are regarded having simply by virtue of existing, such as rights to life, liberty and free speech. Civil rights, such as the right to vote, privacy, to a fair trial or education. A right is an entitlement to something; as such it acts as a protection against the power of the state over an individual. For example the right to a fair trial means that the state may not imprison a person without due process of law.

Critical criminologists such as Herman and Julia Schwendinger (1970) argue we should define crime in terms of violation of human rights rather than breaking of legal rules. This means that states that deny individuals human rights must be regarded as criminal. For example states that practice imperialism, racism or sexism or inflict economic exploitation on citizens are committing crimes because they deny individuals and groups their basic rights. From a human rights perspective the state can be seen a perpetrator of crime and not simply the authority that defines and punishes crime. In this view the definition of crime is inevitably political. For example in the 1930s the Nazis attacked human rights of Jews legally by passing laws that persecuted them. If we accept a legal definition we risk becoming subservient to the state that makes the law. The Schwendingers’ argue that the sociologist’s role should be to defend human rights, if necessary against the state and its laws. Thus their views are an example of transgressive criminology as it oversteps traditional boundaries of criminology that are defined by the criminal law. However Stanley Cohen (2001) criticise the Schwendingers’ view. For example while gross violations of human rights such as genocide are clearly crimes, other acts such as economic exploitation is not self evidently criminal even if we find them morally unacceptable. Other critics argue there’s only limited agreement on what counts as human rights. For example while life is a human right, some would say freedom from poverty is not.

Although Cohen criticises the Schwendingers he nevertheless sees the issue of human rights and state crimes as increasingly central to both political debate and criminology as a result of two factors. One is the growing impact of the international human rights movement, for example through the work of organisations such as amnesty international. Another is the increased focus of criminology on victims.

Cohen looks at the ways states legitimate human rights crimes. He argues while dictatorships simply deny committing human rights abuses democratic states have to legitimate actions in more complex ways. In doing so their justifications follow a three stage spiral of denial. Stage one; “it didn’t happen”, for example the state claims there was no massacre. But then human rights organisations, victims and the media show it did happen with evidence. Stage two; if it did happen, “it” was something else. The state says it’s not what it looks like, “it was self defence”. Stage three; they try and justify their crimes, for example to “protect national security”.

Cohen examines ways in which states and their officials deny or justify their crimes. He draws on the work of Sykes and Matza (1957) who identify five neutralisation techniques that delinquents use to justify their deviant behaviour. Cohen shows how states use the same techniques when they are attempting to justify human rights violations such as torture. Denial of victim, they are terrorists”, Denial of injury; “they started it”, Denial of responsibility; “I was only obeying orders”, Condemning the condemners; “it’s worse elsewhere”, appeal to a higher loyalty “defending the free world”. These techniques do not seek to deny that the event has occurred. Cohen argues they seek to impose a different construction of events of what occurred.

It is often thought those who carry out crimes such as torture must be psychopaths; however research shows there is little psychological difference between them and normal people. Instead sociologists argue such actions are part of a role into which individuals are socialised. They focus on the social conditions in which such behaviour becomes acceptable. For example Kelman and Hamilton (1989) studied crimes of obedience such as the one at My Lai in Vietnam where soldiers murdered 400 civilians. Kelman and Hailton identify three features that produce crimes of obedience. Authorisation; when the acts are ordered or approved by those in authority, normal moral principles are replaced by the duty to obey. Routinisation; once the crime has been committed there is pressure to turn the act into routine which individuals can perform in a detached manner. Dehumanisation; when the enemy is portrayed as subhuman rather than human and described as animals where the usual principles of morality do not apply. Some argue modern society creates conditions for such crime on a vast scale. For example Zygmunt Bauman (1989) argues that the holocaust was a product of modernity, not a return to some premodern barbarism. Bauman argues for the Nazis to be able to commit mass murder many features of modernity were essential. These include science, technology and division of labour. He claims the key to understanding the holocaust is the ability of modern society to dehumanise the victims and turn mass murder into a routine administrative task.

Assess the sociological explanations for differences in the patterns of offending between males and females

Most crime appears to be committed by males. Frances Heidensohn (1996) argues gender differences are the most significant feature of recorded crime; for example official statistics show four out of five convicted offenders are male in England and Wales. Among offenders there are significant gender differences, for example official statistics show a higher proportion of men are convicted of sexual offences and males are more likely to be repeat offenders.

Some sociologists argue official statistics underestimate the amount of female crime. Typically female crimes such as shop lifting are less likely to be reported. For example property crime is less likely to be noticed or reported than the violent or sexual crimes committed by men. Similarly prostitution, committed by more women is more likely to go unreported. Even when women’s crimes are reported they’re less likely to be prosecuted or be let off lightly.

Another argument is called the “chivalry thesis”. The thesis argues that most criminal justice agents are men who are socialised to act in a chivalrous way towards women. Otto Pollak (1950) argues men have a protective attitude towards women. The criminal justice system is thus more lenient with women and thus their crimes are less likely to end up in official statistics. This in turn gives an invalid picture that exaggerates the extent of gender differences in crime. Evidence from self report studies show female offenders are treated more leniently. Women are also more likely to be cautioned than prosecuted and Roger Hood (1992) found women were a third less likely to be jailed than men for similar offences.

However there is evidence against the chivalry thesis. David Farrington (1983) found women were not sentenced more leniently for theft than males. Abigail Buckle (1984) observational study of shoplifting in a department store found men shoplifting twice as much as women despite offenders in official statistics being equal. If women appear to be treated more leniently it is because their offences are less serious. Steven Box (1981) found self report studies conclude women who commit serious offences are unlikely to be treated more leniently than men. The lower rate of prosecutions may be due to offending not serious enough to go to trial. Women offenders are also more likely to show remorse thus they’re more likely to be cautioned than go to court.

Many feminists argue that the criminal justice system is biased against them. Heidensohn argues courts treat women more harshly than men when they deviate from gender norms. For example double standards; courts punish girls more for promiscuous sexual activity. Women who do not conform to accepted standards of monogamous heterosexuality and motherhood are punished more harshly. Stewart (2006) found magistrates perceptions of female defendant’s characters were based on stereotypical gender roles. Pat Carlen (2007) puts forward a similar view in relation to custodial sentences. She argues when women are jailed it’s less for the seriousness of their crime but more of the courts assessment of them as wives, mothers and daughters. Girls whose parents believe them to be beyond control are more likely to receive custodial sentences than females who live more conventional lives. Carlen found Scottish judges were more likely to jail women whose children were in care than women who saw them as good mothers. Feminists argue these double standards exist because the criminal justice system is patriarchal. For example Carol Smart (1989) found judges making sexist, victim blaming remarks in rape cases. Similarly Sandra Walklate (1998) argues in rape cases it’s not the defendant on trial but the victim since she has to prove her respectability in order to have her evidence accepted. Adler (1987) argues women who are deemed to lack respectability, such as single parents, are less likely to have their testimonies believed by court.

The first explanations of female crime were biological rather than sociological. Lombroso and Ferrero (1893) argued criminality is innate, but there are very few born female criminals. Recent psychological explanations have also argued biological factors such as higher testosterone in males can account for violent offending gender differences. However sociologists take the view that social rather than biological factors are the cause of gender differences in offending.

Early sociological explanations of gender differences in crime focus on differences in socialisation of men and women. For example boys are encouraged to be tough meaning they’re more likely to partake in criminal violence. Functionalist Talcott Parsons (1955) traces differences in crime and deviance to the gender roles in the conventional nuclear family. Men take the instrumental breadwinner role outside the home; women perform the expressive role in the home. While it gives girls access to an adult role model it means boys reject feminine models of behaviour that express tenderness and emotion. Boys distance themselves from such role models by engaging in compensatory compulsory masculinity through aggression, which slips into acts of delinquency. Because men have less of a socialising role than women in the conventional nuclear family, socialisation can be more difficult for boys than girls. Albert K. Cohen (1955) argues this lack of an adult male role model means boys are likely to turn to street gangs as a source of masculine identity. In these sub cultural group’s status is earned by delinquency. Similarly new right theorists argue the absence of a male role model in matrifocal lone parent families leads to boys turning to criminal street gangs as a source of status and identity. Sandra Walklate (2003) criticises sex role theory for its biological assumptions. Walklate argues Parsons assumes that because women have biological capacity to bear children they’re best suited for the expressive role. Thus although the theory tries to explain gender differences in crime in terms of behaviour learned through socialisation it is ultimately based on biological assumptions about sex differences.

Recently feminists have put forward alternative explanations for women’s lower rates of crime and deviance. Feminists locate their explanations in the patriarchal nature of society and women’s subordinate position in it. The two main feminist approaches are control theory and liberation thesis.

Frances Heidensohn (1985) argues the striking feature of women’s behaviour is conformity; they commit fewer crimes than men. She argues this is because patriarchal society imposes greater control over women and it reduces their opportunities to offend. Control in the home revolves around women’s domestic role, with its constant round of housework and childcare that imposes restrictions on their time and movement and confines them to the house for long periods, reducing opportunities to offend. Women who try and reject their domestic role find their partners impose it by force, through domestic violence. Dobash and Dobash (1979) show many violent attacks result from men’s dissatisfaction with their wives domestic duties. Men exercise control through their financial power by denying women funds for leisure, increasing their time in the home. Daughters are also subject to patriarchal control. Girls are less likely to be allowed to stay out late. Thus they develop a bedroom culture; socialising at home with friends rather than in public spaces. Girls are required to do more housework than boys thus have less opportunity to engage in deviant behaviour on the streets.

Women are controlled in public by the threat of male violence against them, especially sexual violence. For example Islington Crime survey found 54% of women avoided going out after dark in fear of attack, as opposed to 14% of men. Heidensohn notes sensationalist media reporting of rape adds to women’s fear. Distorted media portrayals of the typical rapist as a stranger who carries out random attacks causes women to stay indoors. Women are also controlled in public from fear of not being defined as respectable. Dress, ways of speaking ect defined as inappropriate can give a woman a reputation. For example women avoid going to pubs for fear of being labelled sexually loose. Sur Lees (1993) notes in school boys maintain control by sexualised verbal abuse if girls fail to conform to gender role expectations.

Women’s behaviour at work is controlled by male supervisors and managers. Sexual violence is widespread and keeps women in their place. Furthermore women’s subordination reduces their opportunities to engage in criminal activity. For example the glass ceiling prevents many women from rising to senior positions where there’s greater opportunity to commit fraud. In general these patriarchal restrictions on women’s lives mean they have fewer opportunities to commit crime. However Heidensohn also recognises patriarchy can push women into crime. For example women are more likely to be poor and may turn to theft to gain a decent standard of living.

Pat Carlen (1988) used unstructured interviews to study 15-46 year old working class women who were convicted of crimes. Although Carlen recognises there are some middle class female offenders she argues most convicted serious female criminals are working class. Carlen uses a version of Travis Hirschi’s (1969) control theory to explain female crime. Hirshi argues humans act rationally and are controlled by being offered a deal; rewards in return for conforming to social norms. People will turn to crime if they don’t believe the rewards will be forthcoming and if the rewards of crime appear greater than the risk. Carlen argues working class women are generally led to conform through the promise of two types of rewards or deals. The class deal; women who work will be offered material rewards with a decent standard of living and leisure opportunities. The gender deal; patriarchal ideology promises women material and emotional rewards from family life by conforming to the norms of a conventional domestic gender role. If these rewards are not available or not worth the effort crime becomes more likely. Carlen argues this was the case of women in her study. In terms of the class deal the women failed to find a legitimate way of earning a decent living and it left them feeling powerless, oppressed and victims of injustice. Many of the women in the study were in poverty, humiliated in claiming benefits and had problems keeping in employment. As they gained no rewards from the class deal they felt they had nothing to lose by using crime to escape from poverty. In terms of the gender deal for conforming to patriarchal family norms most women either didn’t have the opportunity to make the deal or saw few rewards and many disadvantages in family life. Some were abused physically or sexually by fathers or partners, many spent time in care breaking family and friendship bonds and they found themselves poor or homeless. Many women reached the conclusion crime were the only route to a decent standard of living. They had nothing to lose and everything to gain. Carlen concludes that for these women poverty and being brought up in care or an oppressive family life were the two main causes of their criminality. Drug and alcohol addiction and desire for excitement were contributory factors, but they stemmed from being brought up in poverty. Being criminalised and jailed made the class deal less available and crime more attractive.

Heidensohn and Carlen’s approaches to female crime are based on a combination of feminism and control theory. Heidensohn shows the many patriarchal controls that help prevent women from deviating. Carlen shows how the failure of patriarchal society to deliver the promised deals to some women removes the controls that prevent them from offending. However both control theory and feminism can be accused of seeing women’s behaviour as determined by external forces such as patriarchal controls or gender deals. Critics argue this underplays the importance of free will and choice in offending. Furthermore Carlen’s sample was small and may be unrepresentative, consisting as it did largely of working class and serious offenders.

If patriarchal society exercises control over women to prevent them from deviating, then it would seem logical to assume that if society becomes less patriarchal and more equal, women’s crime rates will become similar to men’s. This is the liberation thesis argued by Freda Adler (1975). Adler argues that as women become liberated from patriarchy, their crimes will become as frequent and as serious as men. Women’s liberation has led to a new type of female criminal and a rise in the female crime rate. Adler argues that changes in the structure of society have led to changes in women’s offending behaviour. As patriarchal controls and discrimination have lessened, and opportunities in education become more equal women have adopted traditional male roles in legitimate activity e.g. work and illegitimate activity e.g. crime. As a result women no longer commit traditional female crime such as prostitution. They now commit male offences such as violence. This is because of women’s greater confidence and assertiveness and the fact they have more opportunities in the legitimate structure. For example there are more women in senior positions at work and gives them the opportunity to commit white collar offences such as fraud. There is evidence to support this view, for example overall female offending and female share of offending has increased. Adler argues the pattern of crime has shifted; she cites studies showing women participating in traditionally male crimes such as armed robbery. Martin Denscombe (2001) found increase in girl gangs with members gaining status by delinquency.

However critics reject Adler’s thesis on several grounds. The female crime rate began rising in the 50s, before the women’s liberation movement which emerged in the late 60s. Most female criminals were working class; the group least likely to be influences by women’s liberation, which has benefitted middle class women more. Chesney-Lind (1997) found in the USA poor and marginalised women are more likely to be than liberated women to be criminals. Chesney-Lind found evidence of women branching into male offences such as drugs, however this is because of their link with prostitution; an unliberated female offence. There is little evidence the illegitimate opportunity structure of professional crime has opened up to women. Laidler and Hunt (2001) found female gang members in USA were expected to conform to conventional gender roles, the same as non deviant girls. However Adler’s thesis does draw our attention to investigating the relationship between changes in women’s position and changes in patterns of female offending. However it can be argued she over estimates the extent to which women have become liberated and the extent to which they’re now able to engage in serious crime.

Feminists argue that although “malestream” non feminist theories of crime have only focused on males, these theories have assumed they were explaining all crime rather than solely male crime. Maureen Cain (1989) argues men have not been subject to the criminological gaze, but that most criminals are men. Thus until recently sociologists have not asked what t is about being male that leads men to offend.

However, influenced by recent feminist and post modernist ideas, sociologists have begun to take an interest in why men are more likely to commit crime. Their attention has focused on the concept of masculinity. James Messerschmidt (1993) argues masculinity is a social construct and men have to constantly work at constructing and presenting it to others. In doing so some men have more resources than others to draw upon. Messerschmidt argues that different masculinities coexist within society but that one of this hegemonic masculinity is the dominant, prestigious form that most men wish to accomplish. However some men have subordinated masculinities. These include gay men who have no desire to accomplish hegemonic masculinity, and well as lower class and some ethnic minority men, who lack the resources to do so. Messerschmidt sees crime and deviance as resources that different men may use for accomplishing masculinity. For example class and ethnic differences among youths lead to different forms or rule breaking to demonstrate masculinity. White middle class youths have to subordinate themselves to teachers in order to achieve middle class status, leading to accommodating masculinity in school. Outside school their masculinity takes an oppositional form, for example through vandalism. White working class youths have less chance of educational success so their masculinity is oppositional both in and out of school. It is constructed around sexist attitudes, being tough and opposing teacher’s authority. Black lower working class youths may have few expectations of a reasonable job and may use gang membership and violence to express their masculinity, or turn to serious property crime to achieve material success. Messerschmidt acknowledges that middle class men may also use crime. The difference lies in the type of crime, while middle class males commit white collar and corporate crime to accomplish hegemonic masculinity, poorer groups may use street robbery to achieve subordinated masculinity.

Sever criticisms have been made of Messerschmidt. He is in danger of a circular argument; masculinity explains male crimes e.g. violence because they are crimes committed by males, who have violent characteristics. He also doesn’t explain why not all men use crime to accomplish masculinity. He over works the concept of masculinity to explain virtually all male crime.

Recently globalisation has led to a shift from modern industrial society to a late modern or post modern de-industrialised society. This has led to the loss of many traditional manual labour jobs through which working class men could express masculinity by physical labour and providing for their families. Coincidently job opportunities in industry have declined with expansion in the service sector including the night time economy such as pubs and clubs. For some working class men this has provided legal employment and lucrative criminal opportunities as a means of expressing masculinity. Simon Winlow (2001) studied bouncers in Sunderland, and area of deindustrialisation and unemployment. Working as bouncers provided young men with paid work and the opportunity for illegal business ventures, for example in drugs, as well as the opportunity to express their masculinity through violence. Winlow draws on Cloward and Ohlin’s distinction between conflict and criminal subcultures. He notes in modern society there has always been violent, conflict subculture in Sunderland where hard men earned status through ability to use violence. However the absence of a professional criminal subculture meant little opportunity for a career in organised crime.

Under postmodern conditions, by contrast, an organised professional criminal subculture has emerged as a result of the new illicit business opportunities found in the night time economy. In this subculture the ability to use violence becomes not just a way of displaying masculinity but a commodity with which to earn a living. To maintain their reputation and employability the men must use their bodily capital. For example bouncers seek to increase physical assets by body building. Winlow notes this isn’t just a matter of using violence to win fights but maintain sign language of their bodies so as to discourage competitors from challenging them. Thus signs of masculinity become an important commodity in their own right. This reflects the idea that in post modern society, signs take on a reality of their own independent of the thing they supposedly represent. Winlow’s study is important because it shows how the expression of masculinity changes with the move from a modern industrial society to a postmodern de-industrialised one. At the same time this change opens up new criminal opportunities for men who are able to use violence to express masculinity by creating the conditions for the growth of an organised criminal subculture.

Assess the different sociological approaches to suicide

Durkheim argues our behaviour is caused by social facts; social forces found in the structure of society. Steven Lukes (1992) argues social facts have three features; they’re external to individuals, they constrain individuals shaping their behaviour and they’re greater than individuals, they exist on a different level from the individual. Durkheim argues the suicide rate is a social fact. Using quantitative data from official statistics Durkheim analysed the suicide rate from various European countries. He noted four regular patterns. The suicide rate for any given society remained more or less constant over time. When the rates did change they coincided with other changes. For example rates fell during wartime, but rose during economic depression or prosperity. Different societies had different rates. Within a society the rates varies considerably between social groups. For example Catholics had lower rates than Protestants. For Durkheim these patterns were evidence that suicide rates couldn’t simply be the result of the motives of individuals. For example the population of the army constantly changes but the suicide rate remains the same. Instead of giving a psychological explanation Durkheim explains the suicide rate as the effect of social facts acting on the individual. In different societies these forces act with different degrees of intensity resulting in different suicide rates.

Durkheim identifies two social facts that determine the rate of suicide. Social integration refers to the extent an individual feels a sense of belonging to a group and obligation to its members. In highly integrated groups and societies individuals feel a strong bond with and sense of duty towards others. Moral regulation refers to the extent to which individual’s actions and desires are kept in check by norms and values. Durkheim argues without regulation by socially defined goals and rules individuals desires become infinite and incapable of satisfaction.

Durkheim argues suicide results from either too much or too little social integration. He creates a typology of suicide. Egoistic suicide is caused by too little social integration. Durkheim argues this is the most common type of suicide in modern society, caused by excessive individualism and lack of social ties and obligations to others. This explains the lower rate among Catholics than among Protestants. Both religions condemn suicide but Protestants have more individual freedom in what to believe and how to express their faith whereas Catholics are more tightly integrated by shared beliefs and collective rituals. Egoistic suicide is less common in times of war or political upheaval, since these create a stronger sense of belonging and common purpose.

Altruistic suicide is the opposite of egoistic suicide and is caused by too much social integration. Altruism is the opposite of selfishness or egoism and involves putting others before one’s self. Altruistic suicide occurs where the individual has little value and where the group’s interests override those of the individual. Suicide here is obligatory self sacrifice for the good of the group rather then something freely chosen since the individual feels it their duty to die. For example Hindu widows were expected to throw themselves on their husband’s funeral pyre so as not to burden their family.

Anomic suicide is caused by too little moral regulation. Anomie means normlessness and anomic suicide occurs where society’s values are made obsolete with rapid social change, creating uncertainty in individuals as to what society expects of them. For example the depression of the 1930s produced anomic suicides as well as times of economic boom. Durkheim attributes this to the fact that booms lead to expectations and desires rising more quickly than the means of fulfilling them.

Fatalistic suicide is the opposite of anomic suicide and is caused by too much moral regulation. Fatalism means a belief on the part of the individual that they can do nothing to affect their situation. Fatalistic suicide occurs where society regulates the individual completely. Slaves and prisoners most commonly commit fatalistic suicide.

Durkheim argues modern and traditional society differs in levels of integration and regulation, and this means that we tend to find different types of suicide in each type of society. Modern industrial societies have lower levels of integration. Individual’s rights and freedoms become more important than obligations to the group. This weakens social bonds and gives rise to egoistic suicides. Similarly modern societies are less effective in regulating individuals because they undergo rapid social change which undermines accepted norms and produces anomic suicides. Traditional preindustrial societies have higher levels of integration. The group is more important than the individual and this gives rise to altruistic suicides. Similarly these societies strictly regulate their member’s lives and impose rigidly ascribed statuses that limit individual’s opportunities and this produces fatalistic suicides.

Other positivists since Durkheim have built on his work. Maurice Halbwachs (1930) accepted his positivist approach but added to his theory. Halbwachs argued differences between urban and rural residence were the main reasons for variations in suicide rates. Higher rates among protestants, people living alone ect were more a function of their urban location; these groups were more likely to be found in towns where people live more isolated lives. Sainsbury (1955) found suicide in London boroughs were highest where the levels of social disorganisation were highest.

Jack Gibbs and Walter Martin (1964) wish to make law like cause and effect generalisations and predictions like Durkheim. However they argue Durkheim doesn’t operationalise his concept of integration; he doesn’t define it in a way that can be measured. Gibbs and Martin go on to define integration as a situation where there are stable and lasting relationships. They argue these tend to occur when and individual has status integration; compatible statuses that don’t conflict with one another, such as when their educational and occupational statuses are similar. They predict in societies where there is little status integration the suicide rate will be higher. Other aspects of Durkheim’s study have also been criticised. For example it’s argued the statistics he used were unreliable and incomplete; in the 19th century medical knowledge was limited. Similarly many countries lacked the means needed to collect and compile reliable statistics on a national basis. However these criticisms do not challenge the basic aim of Durkheim’s study, to achieve a scientific explanation of suicide.

Jack Douglas (1967) takes a largely Interactionist approach to suicide. He is interested in the meaning suicide has for the deceased and in the way coroners label deaths as suicides. He criticises Durkheim’s study of suicide on two main grounds.

The decision to classify a death as a suicide is taken by a coroner and influenced by other social actors and this may produce bias in the verdicts reached. Douglas argues this may explain the patterns Durkheim found. For example the finding that a high level of integration leads to low suicide rates can be explained by the fact well integrated individuals may have friends or relatives who deny the death was suicide out of their own feelings of guilt, or even cover up the suicide by destroying a suicide note. Contrastingly socially isolated individuals have no one to oppose a suicide verdict on their behalf. Thus although it might seem as if integration prevents suicide, in fact integration merely affects the likelihood of a death being labelled and recorded as a suicide rather than it actually being a suicide. For Douglas suicide verdicts and the statistics based on them are the product of interactions and negotiations between those involved; relatives, doctors, coroners ECT and factors such as integration influencing these negotiations.

Douglas criticises Durkheim for ignoring the meanings of the act for those who kill themselves and for assuming that suicide has a fixed or constant meaning. Douglas notes that the meanings of suicide can vary between cultures. For example a Japanese samurai and western businessmen may attach different meanings to suicide. These motives and meanings must be understood within their own social and cultural context and this means Durkheim’s attempts to compare rates across cultures are faced with problems. Douglas also rejects Durkheim’s aim to categorise suicide in terms of their social causes. Instead we must classify each death according to its actual meaning for the deceased. To do so we must use qualitative methods and sources to produce case studies based on the analysis of suicide notes and diaries and in depth interviews with the victims friends and relatives. From these we can build up a typology of suicide meanings. Although Douglas did not carry out any case studies himself he suggests that in western societies the social meanings of suicide include escape, repentance, search for sympathy ect. However he points out suicides may have different meanings in other cultures, for example religious ones such as getting into heaven. For Douglas using qualitative data overcomes the problems of using official statistics. Analysis of suicide notes would allow us to get behind the labels that coroners attach to cases and discover the real meaning of the death for the person involved. From this we can get a better idea of the real rate of suicide than the socially constructed one that appears in statistics.

Douglas produces a classification of suicide based on the supposed meanings for the actors. However there is no reason to believe sociologists are any better than coroners at interpreting dead person’s meanings. Sainsbury and Barraclough (1968) found that the rank order of suicide for immigrant groups to the USA correlated closely with the suicide rates of their country of origin despite the fact a different set of labellers were involved. This suggests statistics reflect real differences between groups rather than coroners labelling. Douglas is inconsistent, sometimes suggesting that official statistics are merely the product of coroner’s opinions. At other times he claims we can really discover the causes of suicide; yet how can we if we can never know whether a death was a suicide and all we have is the coroner’s opinions.

J. Maxwell Atkinson (1978) takes a different Interpretivist approach from Douglas, that of ethno methodology. Ethno methodology argues that social reality is simply a construct of its members. We create reality using a stock of taken for granted commonsense knowledge. The sociologist’s job is to uncover what this knowledge is and how we use it to make sense of the world. From this perspective Atkinson reviews Douglas’ contribution. Douglas argues official statistics are constructs of coroners and using qualitative data allows us to get behind meanings of suicide for the deceased. Atkinson accepts Douglas’ first point but rejects his second. Atkinson argues we can never know the real rate of suicide since we would have to know for sure what meanings the dead gave to their deaths, which is impossible. Thus it’s pointless trying to discover the real rate. All we can study is how people make sense of their world. With suicide this means studying how the living comes to classify the death as a suicide. The statistics are neither right nor wrong; they’re merely interpretations made by certain officials and so all we can study is how they are constructed. Atkinson thus focuses on how coroners categorise deaths. He uses qualitative methods. From this research he concludes coroners have common sense knowledge about the typical suicide. This includes what kind of person commits suicide, for what reasons, a typical place of death ect. If a particular case fits their common sense theory coroners are more likely to categorise the death as suicide.

Atkinson argues that coroner’s commonsense theories lead them to see the following types of evidence as relevant; a suicide note or suicide threats prior to death. The mode of death for example hanging is seen as a typical suicide, a road death an accident while drowning is less clear. Location and circumstances, death by shooting is more likely to be labelled suicide if it’s in a deserted lay by rather than a hunting party. Life history; a disturbed childhood or bankruptcies are seen as likely cause of suicide. Coroners regard information such as this as clues to whether the deceased intended to take their own life. For example Atkinson (1971) quotes one coroner saying that in the case of drowning he looked to whether clothes where neatly folded on the beach; if they were it usually points to suicide. Atkinson concludes that coroners are engaged in analysing cases using taken for granted assumptions about what constitutes as a typical suicide. A verdict of a suicide is simply an interpretation of a death based on these taken for granted assumptions. If correct this poses serious problems for theories such as Durkheim’s that treats statistics as facts as all they do is spell out coroners theories of suicide. For example if coroners believe that typical suicides are socially isolated people then more of these people will end up in statistics. The sociologist who then takes the statistics at face value and produces a theory such as lack of integration causes suicide is merely echoing the coroners commonsense theory; not discovering the real cause of suicide.

Structuralist Barry Hindess (1973) criticise ethno methodologists’ approach as self defeating. Atkinson’s view that the only thing we can study about suicide is the coroners’ interpretation can be turned back on him. If all we can have is interpretations of the social world, rather than objective truth about it then ethno methodologist’s accounts are themselves no more than interpretations. If so there is no good reason why we should accept them. However most ethno methodologists accept that their accounts are merely interpretations. Unlike positivists who claim to produce objective, scientific accounts they do not claim that their interpretations are superior to those of the people they study.

Steve Taylor (1982) takes a different approach to both positivists and interpretivists. He argues suicide statistics cannot be taken as valid. For example in a study half of people hit by a train were classed as suicide even though there was no conclusive evidence of suicidal intent. Taylor found that coroners saw factors such as a history of mental illness as indications of suicidal intent and this increased the likelihood of a suicide verdict. However like the positivists Taylor still believes we can explain suicide. He believes we can discover real patterns and causes, though unlike positivists he doesn’t base his explanation on suicide statistics. Instead he adopts a realist approach. This aims to reveal underlying structures and causes, which though not directly observable can explain the observable evidence. He uses case studies to discover the underlying of meaning that cause suicide.

Many theories on suicide focus on acts where the individual was intent on dying and that resulted in death. For example Durkheim’s study is about causes of death resulting directly or indirectly from a positive or negative act by the victim himself, which he knows will produce this result. However Taylor notes that in many cases those who attempt suicide are not certain their actions will kill them. Nor are all who attempt suicide are aiming to die; some are communicating with others. Thus we should look at both successful and unsuccessful attempts and adopt a broader definition of suicide as any deliberate act of self damage or potential self damage where the individual cannot be sure of survival.

Taylor suggests that a situation where the person is most likely to attempt suicide is those where there is complete certainty or uncertainty either about themselves or about others. This gives him four possible types of suicide. The first two types are inner or self directed suicides which Taylor calls ectopic, where the individual is psychologically detached from others. Because of this the suicide attempt is a private, self contained act. There are two types of ectopic suicide. Submissive suicides; where the person is certain about themselves. For example they may know they have no reason to go on, for example a terminal illness. Their suicide attempt is deadly serious, because they know they want to die. Thanatation suicides; where they are uncertain about themselves. For example they may be uncertain about what others think of them. Their suicide attempt involves risk taking, they may or may not survive it, chance will decide for example playing Russian roulette.

The other two types are other directed or symphysic suicides where the individual has an overwhelming attachment to some other person. For example they feel that the other gives them a reason for living. These suicides are not self contained but a way of communicating with others. There are two types. Sacrifice suicides; where they are certain about suicides and know they have to kill themselves. Like submissive suicides their attempt is deadly serious. Usually either they or the person has done something that makes it impossible for the person to go on living, for example betrayal through an affair. This suicide is a form of communication in which they may seek to blame the other for their death, usually so they will suffer guilt. Appeal suicides; where the person is uncertain about others. They have doubts about their importance to the other and attempt suicide to resolve the uncertainty. The attempt is a form of communication that seeks to change the others behaviour. Like Thanatation suicides they involve risk taking and uncertainty about the outcome. They are acts of despair and hope, combining the wish to die and things to change things for the better.

Taylor’s theory is based on his interpretations of the actors’ meanings and there is no way of knowing if these are correct, especially in the case of those who succeeded. Also individual cases may involve a combination of motives and may be difficult to categorise. Taylor’s small sample as case studies while useful in giving insight into motives is unlikely to be representative of suicides in general. Unlike Durkheim, Taylor has not connected the four types to wider social structures. However there are similarities between the two. Taylor’s ideas of certainty and uncertainty parallel Durkheim’s notions of fatalism and anomie respectively. Nevertheless his theory is original and useful in explaining some of the observed patterns of suicide such as why attempts differ in seriousness and why only some leave notes. It also deals with both failed and successful attempts.

Assess Sociological views on the relationship between crime and the mass media

Crime and deviance make up a large proportion of news coverage. Williams and Dickinson (1993) found British newspapers devote up to 30% of their news space to crime.

However while the mass media show interest in crime they give a distorted image of crime, criminals, and policing. For example compared to the picture of crime we gain from official statistics the media over represent violent and sexual crime. For example Ditton and Duffy (1983) found that 46% of media reports were about violent or sexual crimes, yet these made up only 3% of all crimes recorded by the police. The media portray criminals and victims as older and more middle class than those found typically in the criminal justice system. Felson (1998) calls this the age fallacy. Media coverage exaggerates police success in clearing up cases. This is partly because the police are a major source of crime stories and want to present themselves in a good light and partly because the media over represent violent crime which has higher clear up rates than property crime. The media exaggerate the risk of victimisation especially to women, higher status individuals and whites. Crime is reported as a series of separate events without structure and without examining underlying causes. The media overplay extraordinary crimes and underplay ordinary crimes. Felson calls this dramatic fallacy. Media images lead us to believe that to commit or solve crime one needs to be daring and clever – the ingenuity fallacy.

There’s evidence of changes in the type of coverage of crime by the news media. For example Schlesinger and Tumber (1994) found that in the 1960s the focus was on murders and petty crime, but by the 1990s this was of less interest. The change came partly due to the abolition of the death penalty for murder and the rising crime rates meant crime had to be special to attract coverage. There’s evidence of an increasing preoccupation with sex crimes. For example Keith Soothill and Sylvia Walby (1991) found newspaper reporting of rape cases increased from a quarter of all cases in 1951 to over a third in 1985. They note that coverage consistently focuses on identifying a sex fiend or beast. The resulting distorted picture of rape is one of serial attacks carried out by psychopathic strangers. While they occur they’re rare, in most cases the perpetrator is known to the victim.

The distorted picture of crime painted by the news media reflects the fact that news is a social construction. News doesn’t exist out there waiting to be gathered up by a journalist. It’s the outcome of a social process where potential stories are selected while others are rejected. Stan Cohen and Jock Young note news is not discovered but manufactured.

A central aspect of the manufacture of news is the notion of news values. News values are criteria by which journalists and editors decide whether a story is newsworthy enough to make it into the news paper. If a crime story can be told in terms of these criteria it has a better chance of making the news. Key news values influencing the selection of crime stories include; immediacy, dramatisation, personalisation, higher status, simplification, novelty or unexpectedness, risk and violence. One reason why the news media give so much coverage to crime is that news focuses on the unusual and extraordinary, and this makes deviance newsworthy by definition since its abnormal behaviour.

We don’t just get our images of crime from the news media. Fictional representations from TV, cinema and novels are also important sources of our knowledge of crime because so much of their output is crime related. For example Ernest Mandel (1984) estimates from 1945 to 1984 over 10 billion crime thrillers were sold worldwide while 25% of prime time TV and 20% of films are crime shows or movies. Fictional representations of crime, criminals and victims follow what Surette (1998) calls the “law of opposites”; they are the opposite of official statistics and similar to news coverage. Property crime is under represented, while violence, drugs and sex crimes are over represented. While real life homicides mainly result from brawls and domestic disputes, fictional ones are the product of greed and calculation. Fictional sex crimes are committed by psychopathic strangers, not acquaintances. Fictional villains tend to be higher status, middle aged white males. Fictional cops usually get their man. However there are trends worth noting. The new genre of realitiy infotainment shows tends to feature young, non white underclass offenders. There’s also an increasing tendency to show the police as corrupt and brutal and less successful. Finally victims have become more central with law enforcers portrayed as their avengers and audiences invited to identify with their suffering.

There’s long been concern that the media have a negative effect on attitudes, values and behaviour; especially those groups thought to be most susceptible to influence, such as the young, lower classes and uneducated. In the 30s it was cinema, 50s, horror comics, 80s were video nasties. Recently rap lyrics have been blamed for encouraging violence and criminality. There are numerous ways in which the media cause crime and deviance, including imitation, arousal and glamorising offending. However most studies have found that exposure to media violence has a limited negative effect on audiences. However Sonia Livingstone (1996) notes despite such conclusions people continue to be preoccupied with the effects of the media on children because of our desire as a society to regard childhood as a time of uncontaminated innocence in the private sphere.

The media also exaggerate risks of certain groups of people becoming victims of crime such as young women and old people. There is therefore concern that the media may be distorting the public impression of crime and causing an unrealistic fear of crime. Research evidence supports the view that there a link between media use and the fear of crime. Similarly Schlesinger and Tumber (1992) found a correlation between media consumption and the fear of crime with tabloid readers and heavy users of TV expressing greater fear of becoming a victim, especially of physical attack and mugging. However the existence of such correlations doesn’t prove that media viewing causes fear. For example it may be that these who are already afraid of going out at night watch more TV just because they stay in more. Richard Sparks (1992) notes much media affects research, whether the media cause crime or cause fear of crime ignores the meanings viewers give to media violence. For example they may give very different meaning to violence in cartoons. This criticism reflects the Interpretivist view that if we want to understand the possible effects of the media we must look at the meanings people gives to that the see and read.

An alternative approach is to consider how far media portrayals of normal rather than criminal lifestyles might also encourage people to commit crime. For example left realists argue the mass media help to increase the sense of relative deprivation, the feeling of being deprived relative to others among poor and marginalised groups in society. Lea and Young (1996) argue in today’s society where even the poorest groups have media access the media present everyone with images of a materialistic good life of leisure, fun and consumer goods as the norm to which they should conform. The result is to stimulate the sense of relative deprivation and social exclusion felt by marginalised groups who cannot afford these goods. As Merton argues pressure to conform to the norm can cause deviant behaviour when the opportunity to achieve by legitimate means is blocked. In this instance the media are instrumental in setting the norm and thus promoting crime.

A further way the media cause crime and deviance is through labelling. Moral entrepreneurs who disapprove of a particular behaviour may use the media to pressure authorities to do something about the alleged problem. If successful their campaigning will result in the negative labelling of the behaviour and perhaps a change in the law. An important element in this process is the creation of a moral panic. A moral panic is an exaggerated over reaction by society to a perceived problem , usually driven or inspired by the media where the reaction enlarges the problem out of all proportion to its real seriousness. In a moral panic the media identify a group as a folk devil of threat to societal values. The media present the group in a negative stereotypical fashion and exaggerate the scale of the problem. Moral entrepreneurs, editors, politicians, police chiefs, bishops and other respectable people condemn the group and its behaviour. This usually leads to calls for a crackdown on the group. However this may create a self fulfilling prophecy that amplifies the very problem that caused the panic in the first place. For example in the case of drugs setting up special drug squads led the police to discover more drug taking. As the crackdown identifies more deviants there are calls for even tougher action creating a deviance amplification spiral.

Stanley Cohen (1972) examined media responses to disturbances between two groups of largely working class teenagers, the mods and rockers at English seaside resorts from 1964-66 and the way in which this crated a moral panic. Mods wore smart dress and rode scooters, rockers wore leather and drove motorbikes, though in the early stages distinctions were not so clear cut and not many young people identified themselves as belonging to a particular group. The initial confrontations started in Clacton in 1964 with a few scuffles and stone throwing. However although the disorder was minor the media over reacted. Cohen argues the media produced an inventory of what happened containing three elements. The first was exaggeration and distortion. The media exaggerated the numbers involved and the extent of the violence and damage, and distorted the picture through dramatic reporting and sensational headlines, even non events were news. The second element was prediction. The media regularly assumed and predicted further conflict and violence would result. The third element was symbolisation. The symbols of mods and rockers were all negatively labelled and associated with deviance. The media’s use of these symbols allowed them to link unconnected events. For example bikers in different parts of the country ho misbehaved could be seen as part of a more general underlying problem of disorderly youth. Cohen argues that the media’s portrayal of events produced a deviance amplification spiral by making it seem as if the problem was spreading and getting out of hand. This led to calls for an increased control response from the police or courts. This produced further marginalisation and stigmatisation of the mods and rockers as deviants and less tolerance of them and so on in an upward spiral. The media further amplified the deviance by defining the two groups and their sub cultural styles. This led to more youths adopting these styles and drew in more participants for further clashes. By emphasising their supposed differences the media crystallised two distinct identities and transformed two loose knit groupings into two tight knit gangs. This encouraged polarisation and helped to create a self fulfilling prophecy of escalating conflict as youths acted out, the roles the media had assigned them. Cohen notes that media definitions of the situation are crucial in creating a moral panic because in large scale modern societies most people have no direct experience of the events themselves and thus have to rely on the media for information about them. In the case of the mods and rockers this allowed the media to portray them as folk devils – major threats to public order and social values.

Cohen puts the moral panic about the mods and rockers in the wider context of change in post war British society. This was a period in which new found affluence, consumerism and hedonism of the young appeared to challenge the values of an older generation who lived through the hardships of the 30s and 40s. Cohen argues that moral panics often occur at times of social change, reflecting anxieties many people feel when accepted values seem to be undermined. He argues that the moral panic was the result of a boundary crisis where there was uncertainty about where the boundary lay between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour in a time of change. The folk devil created by the media symbolises and gives a focus to popular anxieties about social disorder. From a functionalist perspective moral panics can be seen as ways of responding to a sense of anomie or normlessness created by change. By dramatising the threat to society in the form of a folk devil the media raises the collective conscience and reasserts social controls when central values are threatened. Other sociologists have also used the concept of moral panics. For example Stuart Hall (1979) adopts a neo Marxist approach that locates the role of moral panics in the context of capitalism. They argue that the moral panic over mugging in the British media in the 70s served to distract attention from the crisis of capitalism, divide the working class on racial grounds and legitimate a more authoritarian style of rule. In addition to concern about mods and rockers and mugging commentators have claimed to indentify numerous examples of folk devils across the decades, such as asylum seekers, sex abuse and single parents.

However there are several criticisms of the concept of moral panics. It assumes that the societal reaction is a disproportionate over reaction, but who is to decide how proportional it can be? This relates to the left realist view that people’s fear of crime is in fact rational. There are questions on how the media amplify some problems but not others and why moral panics do not go on increasing indefinitely. McRobbie and Thornton (1995) argue moral panics are now routine and have low impact. In late modern society there is little consensus about what is deviant. Lifestyle choices that were condemned forty years ago such as single motherhood are no longer regarded as deviant and so it’s harder for the media to create panics about them.

The arrival of new types of media is often met with a moral panic. The same is true of the internet; because of the speed it has developed and its scale. The internet has led to fears of cyber crime. Douglas Thomas and Brian Loader (2000) define it as computer mediated activities that are illegal or considered illicit and are conducted through global electronic networks. Yvonne Jewkes (2003) notes the internet creates opportunities to commit conventional crimes such as fraud and new crimes using new tools such as software piracy. Wall (2001) identifies four types of cyber crime. Cyber trespass; crossing boundaries into others cyber property. It includes hacking and sabotage, such as spreading viruses. Cyber deception and theft; including identity theft, phishing and violation of intellectual property rights. Cyber pornography; including porn involving minors and opportunities for children to access porn on the net. Cyber violence; doing psychological harm or inciting physical harm. Cyber violence includes cyber stalking and hate crimes against minority groups as well as bullying by text. Policing cyber crime is difficult because of the sheer scale of the internet and the limited resources of the police, and also because of its globalised nature, posing problems of jurisdiction. Police culture also gives cyber crime low priority because it’s seen as lacking the excitement of more conventional policing. However new information and communication technology provides the police and state with greater opportunities for surveillance and control of the population. Jewkes (2003) argues ICT permits routine surveillance through use of CCTV.

Assess the value of the left and right realist approaches to crime and deviance

Right realism sees crime, especially street crime as a real and growing problem that destroys communities, undermines social cohesion and threatens society’s work ethic. Right realist views correspond with conservative governments as they see it as a workable solution to curb rising crime. It’s led to a shift in thinking, away from researching the causes of crime and towards a search for practical crime control measures. They view the best way to reduce crime was through control and punishment rather than rehabilitating offenders or tackling causes of crime such as poverty. Right realism reflects this political climate. They criticise other theories for failing to offer any practical solutions to the problem of rising crime. They regard theories such as labelling and critical criminology as too sympathetic to the criminal and hostile to law and order. Right realists are less concerned to understand causes of crime and more concerned to offer realistic solutions. Although their main emphasis is on practical crime reduction, they do offer explanation for causes of crime.

Right realists reject the idea put forward by Marxists and others that structural or economic factor such as poverty and inequality are the causes of crime. For example against Marxists they argue the old tend to be poor but have a low crime rate.

Wilson and Herrnstein (1985) put forward a biosocial theory of criminal behaviour. They argue crime is caused by a number of biological and social factors. Biological differences between individuals make some people innately predisposed to commit crimes then others. For example personality traits such as aggressiveness, extroversion, risk taking and low impulse control put some people at greater risk of offending. Herrnstein and Murray (1994) argue the main cause of crime is low intelligence, which they also see as biologically determined.

However while biology may increase the chance of an individual offending effective socialisation can decrease this risk as it involves learning self control and internalising moral values of right and wrong. Right realists argue the best agency of socialisation is the nuclear family. Charles Murray (1990) argues crime is increasing because of a growing underclass who is defined by deviant behaviour and who fails to socialise properly. Murray argues the underclass is growing as a result of welfare dependency. Murray argues the welfare states “generous revolution” since the 60’s has allowed more people to become dependent on the state. It’s led to decline of marriage and growth of lone parent families as women and children can live of benefits. This means men no longer have to take responsibility for supporting families so they no longer need to work. However lone mothers are ineffective socialisation agents for boys. Absent fathers mean boys lack adequate male role models. Thus young males turn to other often delinquent role models on the street and gain status through crime rather than supporting families through a steady job. Murray argues the underclass is not only a source of crime. Its very existence threatens society’s cohesion by undermining the values of hard work and personal responsibility.

Rational choice theory assumes individuals have free will and the power of reason. A rational choice theorist such as Ron Clarke (1980) argues the decision to commit crime is a choice based on a rational calculation of the likely consequences. If the perceived rewards of crime outweigh the perceived costs of crime then people will be more likely to offend. Right realists argue currently the perceived costs of crime are too low and thus the crime rate has increased. For example they argue there’s often little risk of being caught and punishments in any case lenient. Marcus Felson (1998) uses routine activity theory. Felson argues for a crime to occur there must be a motivated offender, a suitable target and absence of a capable guardian. Offenders are assumed to act rationally so the presence of a guardian is likely to deter them from offending. Felson argues informal guardians such as those provided by the community are more effective ones than ones such as the police.

Right realists don’t believe it’s worth trying to deal with causes of crime such as poverty as they can’t easily be changed. They seek to devise practical measures to make crime less attractive. Their main focus is on control, containment and punishing offenders rather than eliminating the underlying causes of their offending or rehabilitating them. Wilson and Kelling’s (1982) article on broken windows argues it’s essential to maintain the orderly character of neighbourhoods to prevent crime taking a hold. Any sign of deterioration such as vandalism must be dealt with immediately. They advocate zero tolerance policy towards undesirable behaviour such as begging. The police should focus on controlling the streets so law abiding citizens feel safe. Crime prevention policies should reduce rewards and increase costs of crime to the offender, for example by target hardening with greater use of prison and maximising their deterrent effect.

However right realism is criticised both for explanations of crime and its solutions. Right realism ignores wider structural causes such as poverty. It overstates offender’s rationality and how far they make cost benefit calculations before committing a crime. While it may explain some utilitarian crime it may not explain violent crime. Its view that criminals are rational actors freely choosing crime conflicts with its view that their behaviour is determined by their biology and socialisation. It also over emphasises biological factors, for example Lilly et al (2002) found IQ differences account for less than 3% of differences in offending. Right realists are preoccupied with petty street crime and ignore corporate crime which may be more costly and harmful to the public. Advocating a zero tolerance policy gives police a free rein to discriminate against ethnic minority, youth ect. It also results in displacement of crime to other areas. Jones (1998) notes that right realists policies in the USA failed to prevent the crime rate rising. It over emphasises control of disorder rather than tackling underlying causes of neighbourhood decline such as lack of investment.

Jock Young argues left realism developed as a response to two main factors; the need to take the rising crime rate seriously and to produce practical solutions and the influence of right realism on government policy. Like Marxists left realists see society as an unequal capitalist one. However unlike Marxists left realists are reformist and not revolutionary socialists; they believe in the gradual social change rather than the violent overthrow of capitalism as the way to achieve greater equality. They believe we need to develop explanations of crime that will lead to practical strategies for reducing it in here and now, rather than waiting for a revolution and a socialist utopia to abolish crime.

The central idea behind left realism is that crime is a real problem and one that particularly affects the disadvantaged groups who are its main victims. They accuse other Marxists against not taking crime seriously. Traditional Marxists have concentrated on the crimes of the powerful such as corporate crime. Left realists agree this is important but argue it neglects working class crimes and its effects. Neo-Marxists romanticise the working class criminals as latter day robin hoods, stealing from the rich as an act of political resistance to capitalism. Left realists argue working class criminals mostly victimise other working class people; not the rich. Labelling theorists see working class criminal’s victims of discriminatory labelling by social control agents. Left realists argue this approach neglects the real victims – working class people who suffer at the hands of criminals. Part of the left realists project is to recognise there has been real increases in crime since the 1950’s, especially working class crime. Young (1997) argues this has led to an aetiological crisis, a crisis in explanation, for theories of crime. For example critical criminology and labelling theory tend to deny that the increase is real. They argue instead it’s the result of an increase in reporting of crime or an increasing tendency to label the poor. Thus the increase in crime statistics is just a social construction, not a reality. However left realists argue the increase is too great to be explained in this way and is a real one; more people are reporting crime because more people are falling victim to crime. As evidence they cite the findings of victim surveys such as the nationwide British crime survey and many local surveys. Taking crime seriously also involves recognising who is most affected by crime. Local victim surveys show that the scale of the problem is greater than official statistics. They also show disadvantaged groups have a greater risk of becoming victims, for example unskilled workers are twice as likely to be burgled then other people. Thus understandably disadvantaged groups have a greater fear of crime and have a greater effect on their lives. For example fear of attack prevents women going out at night. At the same time these groups are less likely to report crimes against them and the police are often reluctant to deal with crimes such as domestic violence, rape or racist attacks.

The second part of the left realist project to take crime seriously involves explain the rise in crime. Lea and Young (1984) identify three related causes of crime; relative deprivation, subculture and marginalisation.

Lea and Young argue crime has roots in deprivation. However deprivation itself is not directly responsible for crime. For example poverty was high in the 1930’s but crime low. Contrastingly since the 50’s living standards have risen but so has the crime rate. W.G. Runcimans (1966) uses the concept of relative deprivation to explain crime. It refers to how deprived someone feels in relation to others or compared to their own expectations. It can lead to crime when people feel resentment that others unfairly have more than them and resort to crime to obtain what they feel they’re entitled to. Leas and Young explain the paradox that today’s society is both more prosperous and crime ridden. Although people are better off they’re now more aware of relative deprivation due to media and advertising which raises everyone’s expectations for material possessions. Those who can’t afford them resort to crime instead. However relative deprivation doesn’t necessarily lead to crime. Young (1999) argues it’s a combination of relative deprivation and individualism. Individualism is a concern with the self and one’s own individual rights rather than those of the group. It causes crime by encouraging the pursuit of self interest at the expense of others. Left realists argue increasing individualism is causing the disintegration of families and communities by undermining the values of mutual support and selflessness on which they’re based. It weakens the informal controls that such groups exercise over individuals, creating a spiral of increasing antisocial behaviour, aggression and crime.

For left realists a subculture is a group’s collective solution to the problem of relative deprivation. However different groups may produce different sub cultural solutions to the problem. For example some turn to crime to close the deprivation gap while others find religion offers them spiritual comfort and what Weber calls a theodicy of disprivilege; and explanation for their situation. Such religious subcultures may encourage respectability and conformity. Key Pryce (1979) found in the black community is Bristol identified a variety of subcultures or lifestyles including hustlers, Rastafarians, saints and working class respectable. Left realists argue criminal subcultures still subscribe to values and goals of mainstream society such as materialism and consumerism. For example young (2002) notes there are ghettos in USA where there is full immersion in the American dream. However opportunities to achieve goals legitimately are blocked so they resort to street crime instead.

Marginalised groups lack both clear goals and organisations to represent their needs. Groups such as workers have clear goals, such as better pay and organisations such as trade unions to pressure employers and politicians. Thus they have no need to resort to violence to achieve such goals. Contrastingly unemployed youth are marginalised. They have no organisation to represent them and no clear goals, just a sense of resentment and frustration. Being powerless to use political means to improve their situation they express their frustration through criminal means such as violence and rioting.

Young (2002) argues we are now living in a stage of late modern society, where instability, insecurity and exclusion make the problem of crime worse. He contrasts today’s society with the period preceding it, arguing the 50s were the golden age of modern capitalism. It was a period of stability, security and social inclusion, with full employment, a comprehensive welfare state, low divorce rates and relatively strong communities. There was general consensus about right and wrong and lower crime rates. Since the 70s instability, insecurity and exclusion have increased. Deindustrialisation and the loss of unskilled manual jobs have increased unemployment and poverty, especially for the young and ethnic minorities, while many jobs are now insecure short term or low paid. These changes have destabilised family and community life and contributed to rising divorce rates as new right government policies designed to hold back welfare spending on the poor. All this has contributed to increased marginalisation and exclusion of those at the bottom. Meanwhile greater inequality between rich and poor and the spread of free market values encouraging individualism has increased the sense of relative deprivation. Young notes the growing contrast between cultural inclusion and economic exclusion as a source of relative deprivation. Media saturated late modern society promotes cultural inclusion; even the poor have access to the medias materialistic, consumerist cultural messages. Similarly there’s greater emphasis on leisure which stresses personal consumption and immediate gratification and leads to higher expectations for the good life. At the same time despite the ideology of meritocracy the poor are systematically excluded from opportunities to gain the glittering prizes of a wealthy society. Young’s contrast between cultural inclusion and economic exclusion is similar to Merton’s notion of anomie – that society creates crime by setting cultural goals such as material wealth while denying people the opportunity to achieve them by legitimate means such as decent jobs. A further trend in late modernity is for relative deprivation to become generalised throughout society rather than being confined by those at the bottom. There is widespread resentment at the undeservedly high rewards that some receive. There is also relative deprivation downwards where the middle class who have to be hard working and disciplined to succeed in an increasingly competitive work environment resent the stereotypical underclass as idle, irresponsible and hedonistic, living of undeserved state handouts. The result of the trend towards exclusion is that the amounts and types of crime are changing in late modern society. Firstly crime is more widespread and is found increasingly throughout the social structure, not just at the bottom of it. It’s also nastier with increase in hate crimes, often the result of relative deprivation downwards, for example attacks against asylum seekers. Reactions to crime by the public and state are also changing. With late modernity society becomes more diverse and there’s less public consensus on right and wrong, so that the boundary between acceptable and unacceptable behaviour becomes blurred. At the same time informal controls become less effective as families and communities disintegrate. This, along with rising crime, makes the public more intolerant and leads to demands for harsher formal controls by the state and increased criminalisation of unacceptable behaviour. Late modern society is thus a high crime society with a low tolerance of crime.

The final part of the left realist project is to devise solutions to the problems of crime. They argue we must improve both policing and control and deal with the deeper structural causes of crime. Kinsey, Lea and Young (1986) argue police clear up rates are too low to act as a deterrent to crime and that police spend too little time actually investigating crime. They argue that the public must become more involved in determining the police’s priorities and style of policing. The police depend on the public to provide them with information about crimes. However the police are losing public support, especially in inner cities and among ethnic minorities and the young. Thus the flow of information dries up and police instead rely on military policing such as swamping an area and using random stop and search tactics. This alienates communities who see the po9lice victimising local youth and it results in a viscous circle; locals no longer trust the police and don’t provide them with information, so the police resort to military policing. Left realists argue that policing must therefore be made more accountable to local communities and must deal with local concerns. Routine beat patrols are ineffective in detecting or preventing crime and stop and search tactics cause conflict. The police need to improve their relationship with local communities by spending more time investigating crime, changing priorities and involve the public in policing policy. Left realists also argue that crime control cannot be left to the police alone – a multiagency approach is also needed. It involves agencies such as local councils, social services and the public.

However left realists do not see improved policing and control as the main solution. They argue the causes of crime lie in the unequal structure of society and major structural changes are needed if we want to reduce levels of offending. For example young argues we must deal with inequality of opportunity and the unfairness of rewards, tackle discrimination, provide decent jobs for everyone, and improve housing and community facilities. We must also become more tolerant of diversity and cease stereotyping whole groups of people as criminal.

Left realists have had more influence on government policy than most theories on crime. They have similarities with the new labour stance of tough on crime, tough on causes of crime. For example new labours firmer approach to the policing of hate crimes echo left realist concerns to protect vulnerable groups from crime. However Young sees these policies as nostalgic and doomed attempts to recreate the golden age in the 50s. Young criticises the record of governments including new labour. He argues they have largely only addressed the symptoms such as anti social behaviour; they have been tougher on tackling crime than crimes underlying issues such as inequality.

Left realism has succeeded in drawing attention to the reality of street crime and its effects on victims of deprived groups. However it has been criticised. Henry and Milovanovic (1996) argue that it accepts the authority’s definition of street crime being committed by the poor instead of defining the problem as being one of how powerful groups do harm to the poor. Marxists argue it fails to explain corporate crimes which is more harmful even if less conspicuous. Interactionists argue that because left realists rely on quantitative data from victim surveys they cannot explain offenders motives. Instead we need qualitative data to reveal their meanings. Their use of sub cultural theory means left realists assume that value consensus exists and that crime only occurs when this breaks down. Relative deprivation cannot fully explain crime because not all those who experience it commit crime. The theory over predicts the amount of crime. Its focus on high crime inner city areas gives it an unrepresentative view and makes crime appear a greater problem then it is.

There are both similarities and differences between the two types of realism. For example both left and right realists see crime as a real problem and fear of crime as rational. On the other hand they come from different ends of the political spectrum; right realists are neo conservative while left realists are reformist socialists. It’s reflected in how they explain crime; right realists blame individual lack of self control while left realists blame structural inequalities and relative deprivation. Likewise political differences are reflected in their aims and solutions to the problem of crime; the right prioritise social order achieved through a tough stance of offenders while the left prioritise justice achieved through democratic policing and reforms to create greater equality.

 

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